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ARE HUMANS ANIMALS?: PATENT CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION IN MARTEK BIOSCIENCES CORP. V. 
NUTRINOVA, INC., 579 F.3D 1363 (FED. CIR. 2009) 
Colleen Murphy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Judges are responsible for claim construction, or in other words, 
interpreting the meaning of terms used to define the scope of an 
invention in a patent to determine whether infringement has occurred.1  
For example, a patent may claim a pen as a “cylindrical utensil” used to 
write on paper.  The patent owner then alleges that a company selling 
crayons has infringed his patent.  The judge would have to examine the 
patent documents to interpret whether the terms claimed in the patent 
encompass a crayon.2  A “cylindrical utensil” of a pen could be 
interpreted as an object that easily fits into a person’s hand to leave 
marks as it is dragged over a surface.  Alternatively, a “cylindrical 
utensil” of a pen may be interpreted as a storage container filled 
specifically with ink.  The first interpretation is broad and would include 
a crayon in the claimed invention, while the second interpretation is a 
narrow approach that would exclude a crayon. 
This dichotomy over claim term interpretation was also an issue in 
Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc.3  Martek made and sold 
docosahexaenoic acid (DHA) products.4  DHA is an omega-3 fatty acid 
“that plays an important role in the development of organs such as the 
heart, brain, and eyes” and has additional health benefits.5  Because it is 
desirable to provide supplemental DHA, Martek obtained a patent for a 
method of increasing the concentration of omega-3 highly unsaturated 
fatty acids (HUFA) in animals by feeding them certain 
microorganisms.6  Martek asserted that the defendant, Lonza, infringed 
 *   Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  The author would like 
to thank Professor Timothy Armstrong for his guidance as well as her family, Trevor Tersmette, Kevin 
Murphy, and Betty Murphy, for their support. 
 1. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).  The 
Supreme Court held that interpreting a claim is a purely legal issue.  Id. 
 2. See id. at 388. 
 3. Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 4. Id. at 1367. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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this patent by using the disclosed method on humans.7  Lonza responded 
that the term “animal” should be interpreted to encompass only 
nonhuman animals, and therefore, the patent was not infringed.8  After 
the district court, using a narrow construction, determined that the term 
“animal” did not include humans, M 9
Martek illustrates that the method of construing patent claim terms, 
broadly or narrowly, greatly affects the decision of whether patent 
infringement has occurred.  Part II of this Casenote further explains 
these two different approaches to claim construction established by the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  Part III describes the Federal 
Circuit’s application, in Martek BioSciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, of the 
broad method of constructing claims by concluding that humans were 
included in the term animal.  Part IV discusses whether it was 
appropriate for the Federal Circuit to employ the broad approach of 
claim construction in a five judge panel.  Finally, Part V concludes that 
the broad approach was not appropriate in Martek because of the 
uncertainty and diminished uniformity it causes in the patent system. 
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RELATED CASES 
The United States Constitution gives Congress the ability to grant 
patents “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”10  After 
inventors obtain a patent, Congress gives them the right to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the 
United States for a period of twenty years from the time the patent 
application was filed.11  Anyone who commits these acts without 
authority from the patent owner is deemed to infringe that patent.12  If a 
patent is infringed, “[a] patentee shall have remedy by civil action for 
infringement of his patent.”13 
To determine whether a patent is infringed, the meaning of the claims 
in issue must first be determined.14  Then, the claims must be read onto 
the accused products.15  The accused product infringes the patent when 
all of the elements of the claims read literally onto the product, or the 
 7. Id. at 1367–69. 
 8. Id. at 1380. 
 9. Id. at 1368, 1379. 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 11. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006). 
 12. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 13. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006). 
 14. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 401 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
 15. Id. 
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product does substantially the same work, in substantially the same way, 
and accomplishes substantially the same result.16  The Supreme Court 
established that determining the meaning of the claims in a patent is a 
question of law.17  The Federal Circuit further provided that it is an issue 
for de novo review.18  Two competing approaches for the method of 
interpreting claims, a broad approach and a narrow approach, have 
emerged from the judges in the Federal Circuit.19 
A. The Role of the Court During Claim Construction 
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the Supreme Court 
determined that interpreting claim terms was a purely legal issue.20  
Markman owned a patent for an inventory control and reporting system 
for dry-cleaning stores.21  Markman sued Westview, claiming that 
Westview was making a product that infringed his patent.22  A key issue 
in the case was what the term “inventory” meant.23  If “inventory” 
merely encompassed cash inventory, Westview would infringe; 
however, if “inventory” encompassed cash inventory and physical 
inventory of articles of clothing, Westview would not infringe 
Markman’s patent.24  Although the jury found that Westview infringed, 
the district court judge granted Westview’s deferred motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.25  The judge determined that interpreting 
the claim term was a legal issue and concluded that “inventory” was a 
broad term that included cash and clothing inventory.26 
Both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision.  The Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit 
that interpreting claims was “the exclusive province of the court . . . .”27  
 16. Id. 
 17. Markman II, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
 18. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454–55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).  The 
Federal Circuit held that the de novo standard of review as stated in Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc. (Markman I), 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, Markman II, 517 U.S. 370 (1996), 
remains good law.  Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1455. 
 19. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (applying a broad 
approach for claim construction); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 
F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying a narrow approach for claim construction). 
 20. Markman II, 517 U.S. at 372. 
 21. Id. at 374–75. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 375. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 376. 
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The Court determined that during the period when the Seventh 
Amendment was adopted to preserve the right to a jury trial, “judges, not 
juries, ordinarily construed written documents.”28  The likelihood that 
judges did the same in patent litigation was confirmed by the earliest 
English reports describing construction of patent documents, which 
showed judges construing the terms, the Supreme Court further found.29  
Therefore, the Court established that for construction of written 
instruments, judges often do and are likely to do better than a jury.30  
Patent construction in particular was considered to be “a special 
occupation” that required “special skill and practice”; therefore, a 
trained, disciplined judge was more likely than a jury to properly 
interpret patents.31  In conclusion, the Supreme Court determined that 
claim construction was solely a role for a judge.32 
B. The Role of the Federal Circuit During Claim Construction 
In Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
concluded that because claim construction is a purely legal issue, the 
court is permitted to conduct its own interpretation of the claims on 
appeal.33  In this case, the patent was exclusively licensed to FAS and 
disclosed a device and method for accurately dispensing industrial 
liquids.34  Cybor Corp. sued FAS seeking declaratory judgment of non-
infringement, invalidity, and unenforceablity.35  FAS counterclaimed for 
infringement of all claims and sought damages and an injunction.36  
Based on the district judge’s construction of the claims, the jury found 
that Cybor Corp. had infringed FAS’s patent.37  The Federal Circuit 
determined that although the law was clear that claim construction was 
the job of the judge, not jury, this case presented the issue of the proper 
role of the circuit court in reviewing the district court’s claim 
construction.38  It concluded that after Markman, de novo review 
remained good law and that the Federal Circuit had the authority to 
 28. Id. at 381–82. 
 29. Id. at 382. 
 30. Id. at 388. 
 31. Id. at 388–89. 
 32. Id. at 391. 
 33. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454–55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 34. Id. at 1451–53. 
 35. Id. at 1453. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1454. 
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reverse legal conclusions of the district court.39  The Federal Circuit 
then performed its own claim construction analysis and affirmed the 
lower court’s decision.40  Thus, the Federal Circuit determined that it 
was permitted to perform its own claim construction as a matter of law 
on appeal.41
C. Alternative Methods to Claim Construction in the Federal Circuit 
In Phillips v. AWH Corp., the Federal Circuit identified the primary 
issue of claim construction as how much emphasis should be placed on 
the patent application itself.42  The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 
states that “[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such 
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same . . . .”43  The 
second paragraph states that “[t]he specification shall conclude with one 
or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the 
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”44  The 
Federal Circuit determined that those two paragraphs frame the issue of 
claim construction.45  The court found the second paragraph requires the 
court to look to the language of the claims to determine what the 
applicant regarded as the invention, and the first paragraph required that 
the specification describe the invention set forth in the claims.46  The 
court found the principal question to be “the extent to which [it] should 
resort to and rely on a patent’s specification in seeking to ascertain the 
proper scope of its claim 47
Although the Federal Circuit has developed a hierarchy of evidence to 
be used when construing patent terms, two competing theories have 
emerged from the Federal Circuit regarding how much reliance should 
be placed on the specification to ascertain the proper scope of the 
claims.48  A broad approach that began with a generic baseline 
 39. Id. at 1454–55. 
 40. See id. at 1456–59. 
 41. Id. at 1454–55. 
 42. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 43. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (applying a broad approach for claim 
construction); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (applying a narrow approach for claim construction). 
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definition of the claim terms was used in Phillips v. AWH Corp., while a 
narrow approach that began with a limited definition of the claim terms 
taken from the patent documents was used in SciMed Life Systems, Inc. 
v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc.49  The Federal Circuit then 
attempted to reconcile these different approaches in Nystrom v. Trex 
Co., Inc.50 
1. Hierarchy of References 
When the Federal Circuit considered Markman I, it presented a 
hierarchy of references for interpreting terms that began with intrinsic 
evidence.51  It found that intrinsic evidence should be heavily relied 
upon and included the patent’s claims, specification, and prosecution 
history.52  First, claims included in the patent application must 
“particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[]” the scope and subject 
that the applicant regards as the invention.53  The specification is a 
written description of the invention, including drawings, that precedes 
the claims in a patent application.54  Second, it must be in “clear, 
concise, and exact terms” that enable a person skilled in the art to make 
and use the invention.55  Third, the prosecution history is a complete 
record of the proceedings before the United States Patent Office while 
the patent application is being considered for issuance.56  In Markman, 
the Federal Circuit found these intrinsic references to be the three main 
sources that judges should use when interpreting claim terms.57 
The Federal Circuit further determined in Vitronics Corp. v. 
Conceptronic, Inc. that extrinsic evidence may also be used for 
interpreting terms, but that it is not as significant as intrinsic evidence.58  
Extrinsic evidence includes evidence that is not a part of the patent or 
prosecution history.59  This includes “expert and inventor testimony, 
dictionaries, and learned treatises.”60  In Markman I, the court 
established that it might be helpful to review this evidence “to explain 
 49. See supra note 48. 
 50. See Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc. (Nystrom II), 424 F.3d 1136, 1145–46 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 51. Markman I, 52 F.3d 967, 978–81 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 52. Id. at 979. 
 53. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 57. Markman I, 52 F.3d at 979. 
 58. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. 
 59. Markman I, 52 F.3d at 980. 
 60. Id. 
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scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms” and to 
“demonstrate the state of the prior art at the time of the invention.”61  
Further, the court in Vitronics stated that using extrinsic evidence to 
understand technology is different than using extrinsic evidence to 
determine the proper construction of a disputed term.62  Extrinsic 
evidence may only be relied upon when determining the proper 
construction of a disputed term if the patent documents, taken as a 
whole, are insufficient to enable the court to construe disputed claim 
terms.63  In Vitronics, the court was asked to construe the meaning of 
“solder reflow temperature.”64  The court held that extrinsic evidence 
was not needed to construe these terms based on the guidance provided 
by the intrinsic evidence.65  Therefore, only when intrinsic evidence 
fails to enable the court to construe claim terms may extrinsic 
supplem 66
2. A Broad Approach to the Use of the Specification During Claim 
Construction 
In Phillips v. AWH Corp., the Federal Circuit applied a broad 
approach to interpret claim terms by beginning with a generic definition 
for the terms and not limiting that definition by the rest of the patent 
documents.67  Phillips invented modular, steel-shell panels that could be 
welded together to form load-bearing, vandalism-resistant walls.68  He 
patented the invention and entered into an arrangement with AWH Corp. 
to market and sell the panels.69  After the relationship terminated, 
however, Phillips received sales brochures from AWH that showed the 
company was continuing to use his invention.70  He then sued for patent 
infringement in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado.71 
The district court determined that AWH did not infringe Phillips’s 
patent because the specification described a specific type of vandalism-
resistant wall containing internal steel “baffles” that did not encompass 
 61. Id. 
 62. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1583–84. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 68. Id. at 1309. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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AWH’s design.72  The court focused on the language of claim one to 
examine how the term “baffles” was used; the claim described “steel 
baffles extending inwardly from steel shell walls.”73  The court further 
established that every textual reference in the specification and its 
diagrams depicted baffles at angles other than ninety degrees to the wall 
faces.74  The court used this evidence to find that in the patent, the 
baffles must extend inward at an oblique or acute angle to the wall 
face.75  Because AWH walls contained baffles at angles of ninety 
degrees, and thus outside of the scope of the patent claims, the district 
court concluded that the company did not infringe the patent.76 
En banc, the Federal Circuit adopted a broader method of claim 
construction to vacate the lower court’s judgment of non-infringement.77  
The court found claims, as a baseline, “are generally given their ordinary 
and customary meaning” from the viewpoint of “a person of ordinary 
skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.”78  The court 
added that the disputed term is deemed to be read by such a person in 
the context of the entire patent, including the specification, rather than 
merely in the context of the particular claim in which the term appears.79  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 1309–28.  Phillips appealed to the Federal Circuit, which initially agreed with the 
district court’s method of claim construction.  Id. at 1309.  On the first hearing, a majority of the divided 
three-judge panel affirmed the district court’s finding of non-infringement.  Id. at 1309–10.  Based on 
the written description, the panel held that the claim term “baffles” excluded structures that extended at 
a ninety-degree angle from the walls.  Id. at 1310.  The court relied on the specification’s repeated 
references to the ability of the claimed baffles to deflect projectiles on its description of the baffles as 
being disposed at such angles that bullets would be deflected.  Id.  The Federal Circuit panel did not find 
in the specification any disclosure of baffles extending from the walls at right angles.  Id.  The panel 
concluded that the patent specification was “intended to support and inform the claims,” and that the 
Phillips patent “ma[de] it unmistakably clear that the invention involve[d] baffle angled at other than 
90” degrees.  Id.  The Federal Circuit panel therefore affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of 
non-infringement.  Id. 
  The dissenting judge on the panel believed that the majority improperly construed the claims 
to limit them to the embodiment of the invention disclosed in the specification, rather than adopting the 
plain meaning of the term “baffles.”  Id.  In the dissenting judge’s opinion, nothing in the specification 
defined the term “baffles” or specifically limited the scope of that term to less than its ordinary meaning.  
Id.  He argued that the specification “‘merely identifie[d] impact resistance as one of several objectives 
of the invention.’”  Id. (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J., 
dissenting in part), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).  He concluded 
that there was “no reason to supplement the plain meaning of the claim language with a limitation” that 
was described in the specification as the preferred embodiment for deflecting bullets.  Id.  The dissenting 
judge construed the term “baffles” in a manner resulting in a finding that AWH infringed the patent.  Id. 
 78. Id. at 1312–13. 
 79. Id. at 1313. 
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The Federal Circuit concluded that a judge should determine this 
meaning by looking to sources available to the public, such as the claims 
themselves, the remainder of the specification, and the prosecution 
history, which shows what a person of skill in the art, would have 
understood the disputed claims to mean.80  The court held that while 
“claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of 
particular claim terms,” claims are fully integrated with and “‘must be 
read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’”81  The court 
further established that if the specification reveals a definition for a term 
that differs from the ordinary meaning of the term, “the inventor’s 
lexicography governs.”82  Thus, the Federal Circuit provided that a 
judge should construct the terms in claims by heavily relying on the 
specification.83 
The Federal Circuit applied this rule to broadly construe “baffles” to 
include more than the preferred embodiment of projections at acute 
angles described in the specification.84  It found that the plain and 
ordinary meaning of “baffles” was the generic dictionary meaning; 
“objects that check, impede, or obstruct the flow of something.”85  The 
court determined that this definition included projections at ninety-
degree angles.86  The court found that intrinsic evidence confirmed a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the term 
“baffles” as used in the patent would have that generic meaning.87  The 
court next dealt with the other claims that specified functions served by 
baffles, such as projecting at angles for deflecting projectiles.88  It held 
that “[t]he fact that the written description . . . sets forth multiple 
objectives to be served by the baffles recited in the claims confirms that 
the term ‘baffles’ should not be read restrictively to require that baffles 
in each case serve all of the recited functions.”89  The court reasoned 
that the United States Patent and Trademark Office would not have 
granted an invalid patent, so “the ambiguity in the claim language 
should therefore be resolved in a manner that would preserve the 
 80. Id. at 1314. 
 81. Id. at 1314–15 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 
1996); Markman I, 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). 
 82. Id. at 1316. 
 83. Id. at 1317. 
 84. See id. at 1324–28. 
 85. Id. at 1324. 
 86. Id. at 1327. 
 87. Id. at 1324–25. 
 88. See id. at 1325. 
 89. Id. at 1326–27. 
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patent’s validity.”90  Consequently, the court construed the term 
“baffles” broadly to encompass more than the embodiment described in 
the specification and to include projections at all angles 91
To return to the example of the pen, a judge applying the broad claim 
construction approach would begin by determining the ordinary and 
customary meaning of the claim term “cylindrical utensil” in a way that 
a person with ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would 
determine it.  This may be the generic dictionary meaning of the term.  
Suppose that the ordinary and customary meaning of the term was “an 
object that easily fits into a person’s hand.”  Next, the judge would read 
the patent application to determine if the claims, specification, or 
prosecution history clearly revealed a definition that differed from this 
meaning.  If the specification clearly defined a “cylindrical utensil” as “a 
storage container specifically filled with ink,” this definition would be 
the inventor’s lexicography and would govern the court’s decision.  If, 
however, the specification merely referred to preferred embodiments 
that were not inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the claim terms, 
the ordinary meaning would prevail.  Therefore, a drawing in the 
specification merely showing a storage container filled with ink could 
not restrict the definition to require ink unless it was clearly stated.  This 
illustrates the broad method that judges may use to construe patent claim 
terms. 
3. A Narrow Approach to the Use of the Specification During Claim 
Construction 
In SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, 
Inc., the Federal Circuit exercised a narrow approach to interpreting 
claim terms that were limited by the patent documents.92  SciMed 
owned three patents that covered balloon dilatation catheters, used in 
coronary angioplasty procedures to remove coronary artery 
restrictions.93  The claimed catheters contained two passageways, called 
lumens.94  The parties agreed that only two arrangements for the lumens 
existed.95  The dual lumen configuration featured lumens positioned 
 90. Id. at 1327. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See generally SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 93. Id. at 1338–39. 
 94. Id. at 1339. 
 95. Id. 
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side-by-side within the catheter.96  The second configuration, the coaxial 
configuration, placed one lumen inside the other and was annular in 
shape when viewed in cross-section.97  SciMed sued Advanced 
Cardiovascular Systems for infringement of its patent by using a dual 
lumen configuration.98  The court had to determine whether SciMed’s 
patents encompassed the dual lumen configura 99
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s narrow approach to 
claim construction and agreed that the specification limited the scope to 
coaxial lumens.100  SciMed argued that this method of claim 
construction would be reading a limitation from the written description 
into the claims, a “cardinal sin[] of patent law.”101  The Federal Circuit, 
however, rejected that argument because the district court read the 
claims “‘in view of the specification, of which they are a part,’” as 
mandated by the Federal Circuit in Markman I.102  The appellate court 
found that “[w]here the specification makes clear that the invention does 
not include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be outside the 
reach of the claims . . . .”103  It added that that is the case “even though 
the language of the claims, read without reference to the specification, 
might be considered broad enough to encompass the feature in 
question.”104  The court also found that the claims were limited when 
only one embodiment was described and enabled in the specification: 
“‘when the “preferred embodiment” is described as the invention itself, 
the claims are not entitled to a broader scope than that embodiment.’”105 
The court applied these findings to the catheter described in SciMed’s 
patents to establish that the specification limited the claims to a coaxial 
configuration.106  First, the court read the abstract of the specification to 
refer to an inner tube and an annular position, which identified a coaxial 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1338–40. 
 99. Id. at 1340. 
 100. See id. at 1345.  The district court applied a narrow approach to claim construction by 
reading the specification to hold that the patents did not cover the dual lumen configuration.  See id. at 
1339.  The district court found that the language contained in the specification expressly limited all 
embodiments of the claimed invention to a coaxial structure.  Id.  SciMed conceded that under the 
district court’s claim construction, Advanced Cardiovascular did not infringe its patents, and SciMed 
appealed to the Federal Circuit.  Id. at 1345. 
 101. Id. at 1340. 
 102. Id. (quoting Markman I, 52 F.3d 967, 979–80 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). 
 103. Id. at 1341. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (quoting Wang Labs, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 106. See id. at 1342–45. 
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configuration.107  Second, the court found that the portions of the written 
descriptions of each of SciMed’s patents discussing disadvantages of 
prior art structures explained that dual lumen configuration catheters 
have shaft sizes larger than necessary and are stiffer than desired.108  
Third, the court examined the summary of invention, which described an 
inner core tube with a guide wire lumen extending through it and an 
outer sleeve extending annular inflation lumen, characterizing a coaxial 
configuration.109  The Federal Circuit construed the specification in a 
way that the claims excluded the dual lumen arrangement.110 
In the example of the pen, the narrow claim term construction method 
also begins with determining the ordinary meaning of the claim terms.  
However, this is accomplished by reading the other claims, 
specification, and prosecution history.  Suppose that the patent 
documents repeatedly stated that pen was a storage container filled with 
ink, but illustrated the pen as an object that easily fits into a person’s 
hand in the drawings.  Then, under the narrow method of claim 
construction, the term would be construed with the limited definition of 
a storage container filled with ink that easily fits into a person’s hand as 
the ordinary meaning.  This meaning could not then be broadened to 
include other embodiments, even though the other embodiments could 
fall within the meaning of the text of the documents.  For example, a 
jumbo pen would not then be covered by the narrow meaning of the 
term pen, because although it is a storage container filled with ink, it 
would not easily fit into a person’s hand.  This illustrates the narrow 
method of claim construction. 
4. Reconciling the Different Approaches 
In Nystrom v. TREX Co., Inc., the Federal Circuit attempted to 
reconcile the broad and narrow approach of claim construction in light 
of Phillips.  Nystrom invented boards for use in constructing floors for 
decks.111  Nystrom sued TREX, which manufactured deck floor planks 
made out of composites of recycled plastic and wood fibers, for 
infringement of his patent.112  The court had to decide whether the term 
 107. Id. at 1342. 
 108. Id. at 1342–43. 
 109. Id. at 1343. 
 110. Id. at 1343, 1345. 
 111. Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc., 374 F.3d 1105, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nystrom I), withdrawn, 
opinion replaced by Nystrom II, 424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 112. Id. at 1109. 
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“board” in Nystrom’s claims included non-wood materials.113 
Initially, the Federal Circuit began the claim construction with a 
broad meaning by reviewing the claims themselves, dictionaries, 
treatises, the specification, and prosecution history to determine the 
claim term’s ordinary meaning.114  The court noted that the ordinary and 
customary meaning could “be overcome if the patentee has acted as his 
or her own lexicographer in explicitly setting forth a definition” or has 
clearly disclaimed the scope of coverage.115  After reviewing these 
references, the court found the word “board” to encompass both a piece 
of wood and a similarly shaped piece of a rigid material.116  The court 
found this because “Nystrom did not disclaim boards made from 
materials other than logs.”117  It read the specification to describe logs as 
a preferred embodiment, which recognized that decking boards may be 
made from other rigid materials.118  After construing the meaning of 
“board,” the court found that the term should be given the full range of 
its ordinary meaning, consistent with the written description, to include 
TREX’s wood composite decking material.119 
The Federal Circuit then reconsidered Nystrom in light of Phillips and 
narrowed its claim term construction.120  The court repeated that the 
claims did “not include any language describing the ‘board’ as cut from 
a log or necessarily being made of wood.”121  The court, however, then 
examined the specification to determine that “‘board’ must be limited to 
wood cut from a log.”122  The written description, stating that “[a] 
variety of specialized flooring materials have been developed for interior 
and exterior use,” discussed “wood flooring materials for exterior 
use.”123  The written description maintained that context, the court 
 113. Id. at 1110–11.  The district court applied a limited definition of the claim term and construed 
the word “board” to mean “‘a piece of elongated construction material made from wood cut from a 
log.’”  Id. at 1121.  It concluded that Nystrom limited the scope of the claim term with statements in the 
specification that a board was cut or obtained from a log and with statements made by Nystrom during 
prosecution in arguing against a rejection.  Id.  Consequently, the district court held the claims limited to 
boards made of wood and found for non-infringement.  Id.  Nystrom appealed the decision because the 
claim language did not contain a description of the material.  Id. at 1110–11.  Also, he contended that it 
was an error to rely on statements in the specification to limit the claims because those statements did 
not constitute a clear disavowal of claim scope.  Id. at 1111. 
 114. Id. at 1111–13. 
 115. Id. at 1111. 
 116. Id. at 1111–12. 
 117. Id. at 1112. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Id. at 1113. 
 120. Nystrom II, 424 F.3d 1136, 1138, 1145–46 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 121. Id. at 1143. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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found.124  The court also reviewed the prosecution history, which 
“provide[d] additional context . . . consistent with the written 
description.”125  The court found that Nystrom’s statements during 
prosecution described the invention as cut from a log.126  The court 
explained that under Phillips, Nystrom was “not entitled to a claim 
construction divorced from the context of the written description and 
prosecution history.”127  Because the written description and prosecution 
history consistently used the term “board” to refer to wood, the court 
interpreted the term in the claim to use that definition and limit the claim 
term.128 
The Federal Circuit then explained that this narrow claim construction 
was consistent with its decision in Phillips, which applied a broad claim 
construction approach.129  It reconciled the cases by explaining that in 
Phillips, the ordinary meaning of “baffles” included all angles, and the 
language in the patent application did not limit the ordinary meaning.130  
In Nystrom, however, the ordinary meaning of “board” was a sawed 
piece of lumber, and Nystrom sought to broaden that definition in his 
arguments.131  The court found that broadening the definition absent 
language in the intrinsic record evidencing an intent to broaden a term’s 
definition beyond its ordinary meaning violated claim construction 
principles announced in Phillips.132 
III. MARTEK BIOSCIENCES CORP. V. NUTRINOVA, INC. 
In Martek, the Federal Circuit closely followed the broad claim 
construction approach expressed in Phillips to interpret the term 
“animal” in Martek’s claims to be governed by a single definition in the 
specification.133  The court was asked to construe the term “animal” to 
determine whether Lonza infringed Martek’s patent by implementing the 
described invention to increase DHAs on humans.134  Martek’s patent 
contained one sentence that defined the term “animal” as any organism 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1143. 
 126. Id. at 1144. 
 127. Id. at 1144–45. 
 128. Id. at 1145. 
 129. See id. at 1145–46. 
 130. Id. at 1145. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1145–46. 
 133. See Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 134. Id. at 1368, 1379. 
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belonging to the animal kingdom.135  However, the rest of patent 
application, including the claims and written description, described 
animals that produced food.136  The court relied on Phillips to hold that 
“[w]hen a patentee explicitly defines a claim term in the patent 
specification, the patentee’s definition controls.”137  The court 
determined that the patent specification clearly defined the term 
“animals” as any organism belonging to the animal kingdom.138  It also 
found that humans are a part of that kingdom and were therefore covered 
by the claims.139  Thus, the Federal Circuit followed Phillips to allow 
Martek to define “animal” broadly.140 
The Federal Circuit held that the references to food-producing non-
human animals merely described preferred embodiments that should not 
be read to limit the scope of the claims.141  The court concluded that the 
disclosure of preferred non-human animals did not constitute a clear 
exclusion of humans.142  It found that the repeated references to animals 
that produced milk products, eggs, meat, and seafood did not disavow 
humans because those animals were preferred embodiments and found 
further that animals were not required to produce a food product.143  
Also, the court stated that the patent application did not exclude humans 
because no words or phrases manifestly disclaimed patent coverage.144  
It concluded that the generic words used to describe “animals” could be 
applied to humans.145  Therefore, the Federal Circuit did not limit the 
scope of the claims based on the descriptions given in the 
specification.146 
Two judges on the five-judge Federal Circuit panel dissented from the 
majority opinion in favor of a narrow claim construction approach 
because the definition of “animal” conflicted with the rest of the 
specification.147  The dissenters agreed that patentees could be their own 
lexicographers and that the specification recited a definition of animals 
 135. Id. at 1380. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1381. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1380–82. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1381–82. 
 144. Id. at 1381. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1382. 
 147. Id. at 1382–85 (Lourie, J., dissenting in part). 
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that included humans.148  The judges, however, viewed Martek’s single-
sentence definition of the term “animal” to be totally negated by the 
other text.149  Judge Lourie, in dissent, suggested that a claim term must 
be read “in a manner that comports with the . . . patent as a whole.”150  
Rather than reading the single-line definition in isolation, the dissenters 
stated, one should read the entire patent to properly construe the 
meaning.151  The dissenters found that the term “animal” would have 
excluded humans from the scope of Martek’s patent.152 
The dissenting judges then considered the entire specification to 
construe “animal,” employing a narrow claim construction method.153  
The judges began their analysis with the language in claim one, the 
broadest claim, which claimed “a method of raising an animal” to 
increase the concentration of omega-3 HUFA in the animal.154  They 
also relied on the rest of the specification, which was directed to raising 
non-human animals, not to rearing children.155  Further, they found the 
wording of the invention that described raising animals and food 
products to be limiting language.156  Also, the dissenters relied on the 
summary of the invention in the patent, which stated that animals raised 
by the invented process included poultry, cattle, swine, and seafood.157  
The sentences directly following the definition of “animal” in the 
specification listed non-human animals from which food products are 
derived.158  The dissenters reasoned that the ways “animal” was used in 
the remainder of the specification were not preferred embodiments, but 
strongly supported a conclusion that the invention excluded humans.159 
The dissenting judges, relying on the entire specification, determined 
that the invention not only excluded humans, but distinguished animals 
from humans.160  They noted that the specification discussed a method 
to incorporate the invention into animal feed.161  The dissenters 
concluded that the specification differentiated humans and animals when 
 148. Id. at 1382–83. 
 149. Id. at 1383–85. 
 150. Id. at 1383. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1383–84. 
 158. Id. at 1384. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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it referred to how the invention could “‘enhance . . . the nutritional value 
of processed foods for human intake or for animal feed.’”162  They 
believed that there would have been no need to specify treatment for 
humans if humans were included in the meaning of “animals.”163  The 
dissenters reasoned that “the fact that the milk or meat products of the 
animals subjected to the method of the patent can be fed to humans does 
not mean that humans are among the animals that are raised . . . .”164  
They criticized the majority for “fail[ing] to make a distinction between 
using omega-3 HUFAs as a nutritional supplement for humans and 
animals, . . . clearly contemplated in the patent, and raising humans to be 
the source of such a nutritional supplement . . . .”165  Therefore, the 
dissenting judges would have limited the term “animal” in the claims to 
non-humans.166 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The Supreme Court placed the authority for construing claims with 
the judges of the Federal Circuit by holding that it is a solely legal 
issue.167  The Federal Circuit has provided two conflicting methods for 
interpreting claim terms, a broad approach and a narrow approach, 
which have not been reconciled.168  The judges in Martek followed 
Phillips to arrive at a broad definition of the term “animals.”169  
However, this broad approach could enlarge problems within the patent 
system.  An improved solution would be to apply a narrower method of 
construing claims. 
A. The Methods of Claim Construction Used by the Federal Circuit Are 
Inconsistent 
In Phillips, the broad claim construction approach applied by the 
Federal Circuit was inconsistent with its own reasoning.  The court held 
that the judge should use the plain and ordinary meaning of a term found 
in the intrinsic record of the claims, specification, and prosecution from 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1384–85. 
 167. Markman II, 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). 
 168. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (applying a broad 
approach for claim construction); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 
F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying a narrow approach for claim construction). 
 169. Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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the viewpoint of a person with ordinary skill in the art.  It further held 
that dictionaries may be used beyond that if necessary.170  However, it 
then began its analysis with a broad dictionary meaning as the baseline 
for the claim term meaning.171  It then read the claims, specification, and 
prosecution history to determine whether the inventor used meanings 
that differed from the dictionary meaning.172  If there were differences, 
the court found them to be preferred embodiments that could not be read 
to limit the claims.173  It therefore was inconsistent with its own 
reasoning to begin with an extrinsic dictionary meaning that was not 
altered by any differences within the intrinsic evidence. 
In addition, the broad and narrow approaches prescribed by the 
Federal Circuit are inconsistent with each other.  In SciMed, the Federal 
Circuit used a narrow approach to define the claim terms that used the 
specification as part of the baseline definition of the claim term instead 
of a generic ordinary meaning in the broad approach.174  In this 
approach, the court also began with the plain and ordinary meaning of 
the term.175  However, the narrow approach used a different starting 
place because it established the baseline meaning relying on the 
specification, other claims, and prosecution history.176  From this 
reading, the court found a limited plain and ordinary meaning of the 
claim terms was limited to an annular, coaxial lumen configuration.177  
The descriptions in the patent application were not preferred 
embodiments, but went directly to defining the claim terms.  SciMed 
demonstrated a more narrow approach to determining the meaning of 
claim terms that applied the written description in the patent documents 
to the ordinary meaning of the claim term in question.  The different 
baseline meanings and view of preferred embodiments demonstrate the 
inconsistencies of the broad and narrow approaches to claim 
construction that the Federal Circuit applied. 
In Nystrom, the Federal Circuit then interpreted its broad method of 
claim construction from Phillips as a narrow claim construction method.  
Prior to Phillips, the court in Nystrom, began with a broad dictionary 
definition.178  It then found the other descriptions in the patent to be 
 170. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319. 
 171. Id. at 1324–25. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 1326–27. 
 174. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Nystrom I, 374 F.3d 1105, 1112 (Fed. Cir. 2004), withdrawn, opinion replaced by Nystrom 
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preferred embodiments that did not disclaim non-wood materials.179  
After Phillips, the Nystrom court revised its decision to apply the law 
from Phillips.  In this application, the court began with a plain and 
ordinary definition of “board” read from the specification, other claims, 
and prosecution history.180  It found the definition to be a limited one 
that excluded non-wood materials from the embodiments described.181  
It followed the reasoning in Phillips, which actually specifies a narrow 
claim construction approach.  When applying the law from Phillips, the 
Federal Circuit took the narrow approach similar to that taken in SciMed 
instead of the approach actually used in Phillips. 
In summary, the Federal Circuit unsuccessfully reconciled these 
inconsistent claim construction approaches.  The different claim 
construction methods began with a different baseline meaning.  Both 
cases began with the ordinary meaning of the term, but Phillips used a 
broad dictionary meaning as the ordinary definition, while Nystrom 
began with a limited meaning read from the patent specification as the 
ordinary definition.182  The court then read the descriptions of the 
invention in Phillips as preferred embodiments that could not be used to 
narrow the claims.183  In Nystrom, however, the descriptions were 
already a part of the claim meaning and were not considered to be 
preferred embodiments.184  Thus, Nystrom was unable to go broader 
than that meaning to encompass a dictionary definition of other non-
wood materials as Phillips did for baffles.  The Federal Circuit attempted 
to reconcile these approaches by stating that the rules articulated in 
Phillips would not allow Nystrom to broaden the ordinary meaning of 
the claim term.185  However, the court failed to consider the different 
starting points for the two methods in its attempt to reconcile the cases.  
Because of the differences in determining the baseline of the claim 
meaning, the use of a broad approach in Phillips and a narrow approach 
in Nystrom cannot be reconciled. 
 
II, 424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 179. Id. at 1112–13. 
 180. Nystrom II, 424 F.3d at 1144. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1143–44. 
 183. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 184. Nystrom II, 424 F.3d at 1145. 
 185. Id. 
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B. The Federal Circuit Applied the Broad Phillips Approach in Martek 
The Federal Circuit in Martek began with a broad, ordinary meaning 
of the claim term, similar to Phillips.  It noted that patentees may be 
their own lexicographers and began with the definition of “animal” 
given by the patentee: any member of the animal kingdom.186  This 
could be viewed as different from Phillips because that case began with 
a dictionary meaning, while Martek began with a meaning given in the 
specification.  However, Martek’s meaning was a broad definition that 
was not taken from reading the entire specification, but merely one 
sentence.  Because the term “animal” was given such a broad meaning, 
it included humans as part of the animal kingdom.187  This broad 
meaning given as the plain and ordinary definition of the term animals is 
similar to the method provided in Phillips. 
Because the court began with a broad, ordinary meaning for the claim 
term, the other descriptions were viewed, as in Phillips, as preferred 
embodiments that could not limit the claims.  Martek’s entire 
specification repeatedly described animals that produced a food 
product.188  Because these descriptions were not used to determine the 
ordinary meaning of the term, the court followed Phillips to view them 
as preferred embodiments.  Because the limitations to economic animals 
were viewed as preferred embodiments, it was not read to restrict the 
scope of the claims.  Therefore, the Federal Circuit followed the broad 
approach applied in Phillips to interpret the meaning of claim terms. 
C. Problems Associated with the Broad Application of Claim 
Construction in Martek 
The broad application of claim construction followed by the Federal 
Circuit in Martek enlarges problems within the patent system.  For 
instance, inventors may be granted a monopoly on more than what they 
intended or on more than was disclosed to the public.  Because an 
inventor may be granted coverage on more than was disclosed, the 
public is not put on notice of what it is able to make, use, or sell, which 
leads to uncertainty in the patent system.  The inconsistencies in the 
Federal Circuit’s decisions also diminish uniformity in the patent 
system. 
 186. Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1381–82. 
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1. Martek Failed to Consider the Inventor’s Intent 
By interpreting “animals” to include humans, the Federal Circuit did 
not consider what Martek intended to be its invention at the time the 
patent application was filed.  As the dissenting judges stated, reading the 
specification as a whole leads to the conclusion that the DHA 
supplements were meant only for non-human animals.189  The dissenters 
argued that the intent of the patentee was only to include humans and 
animals in the food product of the supplemented animals, not to include 
humans to make food products for humans.190  The consistent references 
to economic and food-producing animals demonstrated intent only to 
include non-humans in the meaning of animals.  By giving the patentee 
a broader definition, the court gave the patentee more than what he 
intended his invention to be.  If the patentee intended to include humans 
as part of the supplemented animals, more thought should have been 
given to develop an invention for humans rather than merely lumping 
them in with non-human animals. 
As in contract law, the judge in a patent case interprets the drafter’s 
intent in creating and signing the document.191  A court looks 
objectively to the intent and demonstration of the parties to find if there 
was a valid “contract” with mutual assent.192  The Restatement (First) of 
Contracts provides that “[a] manifestation of mutual assent by the parties 
to an informal contract is essential to its formation and the acts by which 
such assent is manifested, must be done with the intent to do those 
acts.”193  Similarly, the judge should interpret the intent of the patentee 
in drafting h
The failure to consider the inventor’s intent in Martek also broadened 
the scope of the monopoly to violate 35 U.S.C. § 112.  Congress granted 
patent monopolies in exchange for public disclosure to promote 
sciences.194  This monopoly was not to be freely given, and 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 requires a clear disclosure to enable a person skilled in the art to 
make and use the invention.195  The descriptions in the specification in 
Martek only described non-human “animals.”  It therefore did not 
clearly disclose how to perform the invention with human “animals.”  
Not clearly pointing out the scope of the invention and failing to enable 
 189. Id. at 1382–85 (Lourie, J., dissenting in part). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc., 93 A.2d 272, 278 (Md. 1952). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1932)). 
 194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 195. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1966); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
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a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention 
violates 35 U.S.C. § 112.  Thus, by adopting a broad meaning of 
“animals,” the Federal Circuit unreasonably enhanced the scope of 
Martek’s patent monopoly. 
2. The Broad Claim Construction Approach in Martek Causes 
Uncertainty in the Patent System 
Additionally, a broad claim construction approach increases 
uncertainty in the patent system because it prevents the public from 
clearly knowing what the patent covers.  Intellectual property can be 
compared to real property, where deeds expressly mark the boundaries 
of what land a person owns.  However, if the court chooses a broad 
definition not clearly defined in the specification, the boundaries of the 
invention will not be clearly marked.  The public will not be put on 
notice regarding what it can make, use, or sell.  Dictionary meanings 
may change or vary between editions, which leads to uncertainty.  This 
is why the Federal Circuit concluded that extrinsic evidence is not as 
reliable as intrinsic evidence.196  It is difficult to determine the endless 
embodiments of an invention not taught in the patent.  The court may 
include more than was considered in the patent application in the claim 
term meaning, which does not let the public know what is included. 
Martek provides an example of the uncertainty in the patent system 
caused by an unclear broad claim meaning.  Martek provided a 
definition in the specification for the term “animal.”  However, it was 
only a single sentence and was inconsistent with the rest of the 
specification.  By allowing Martek to have the broad meaning from a 
single sentence, it is uncertain what its invention covered.  It was 
unexpected and unclear that the multiple references to food-producing 
non-human animals would cover an application to humans.  The court 
should have considered the specification as a whole to find the ordinary 
meaning of the claim term.  The specification was available to the public 
and would have put the public on proper notice of what was included in 
the invention to lead to more certainty in the patent system. 
3. The Broad Application in Martek also Diminishes Uniformity in the 
Patent System 
The two inconsistent methods of claim construction developed by the 
Federal Circuit diminish uniformity within the patent system.  As 
 196. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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previously discussed, the two approaches to claim construction are 
inconsistent because each uses a different method to determine the 
baseline meaning of the claim terms.  Also, including external sources 
used in determining the baseline definition of a claim term provides less 
reliability regarding where the court will obtain this baseline.  The 
Supreme Court deemed uniformity to be an important element in patent 
law.197  The Federal Circuit was specifically created to provide more 
uniformity in the patent system because it is a national process.198  The 
Supreme Court also found claim construction to be a purely legal as a 
means of providing uniformity and stability in the patent system.199  The 
Federal Circuit is failing to provide this much-needed uniformity by 
inconsistently applying the different approaches. 
D. A Narrow Approach for Claim Construction Would Solve Problems 
in the Patent System 
The narrow approach of claim construction would include the 
patentee’s intent of what the invention covered.  As stated in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112, the patent must put forth claims that define the boundaries of the 
invention, and the specification must describe the claims.200  Therefore, 
the patent application itself contains the inventor’s intent of what the 
scope of the invention is.  The narrow approach closely follows this 
intent by establishing the baseline of the claim terms from the claim 
language and specification that the inventor set forth.  This is also 
similar to contract law, which interprets the contract to consider the 
parties’ intent to be bound.201  This approach differs from beginning 
with a generic ordinary meaning to find objectively what the claim terms 
mean, which was too departed from the intent of the inventor.  Thus, the 
court should use the baseline of the claim meaning by using the 
specification and claims to gain the inventor’s intent required by 35 
U.S.C. § 112, instead of a broad ordinary meaning departed from this 
intent. 
The narrow claim construction approach would also improve the 
uncertainty contained within the patent system.  The broad approach is 
uncertain because of the baseline for determining the claim meaning.  
When the baseline meaning of the claim term is external and easily 
 197. Markman II, 517 U.S. 370, 390–91 (1996). 
 198. Int’l Law Office, Ropes & Gray, Supreme Court Limits Federal Circuit Jurisdiction over 
Patent Appeals, Oct. 2002, http://www.ropesgray.com/newspubs/detail.aspx?publication=583. 
 199. Markman II, 517 U.S. at 390–91. 
 200. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 201. Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc., 93 A.2d 272, 278 (Md. 1952). 
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changed, depending on which dictionary is used, the broad approach is 
difficult to predict.  However, the narrow approach is contained within 
the patent documents.  As stated in Phillips, this is desirable because it is 
isolated from change and more reliable.202  It provides a certain baseline 
meaning for the claim terms.  Because a person would only need to 
inspect the isolated and unchanging patent documents, this narrow claim 
construction approach would eliminate some of the uncertainties within 
the patent system. 
A narrow approach to claim construction would also improve 
uniformity within the patent system.  The patent system is a national 
system, but the split in the Federal Circuit case law does not provide this 
intended uniformity.  Choosing one claim construction approach would 
increase uniformity.  The narrow claim construction approach would be 
advantageous because it also considers the inventor’s intent and 
provides more certainty.  Thus, the Federal Circuit should settle on the 
narrow claim construction approach to optimally improve the patent 
system. 
If the Federal Circuit had applied the narrow claim construction 
approach in Martek, the appropriate result would have been reached to 
not include humans in the term “animals.”  Reading the entire patent 
document as a whole suggests that Martek did not consider humans to be 
covered by the invention.  The narrow approach would have included 
the inventor’s understanding into the baseline meaning of animals and 
followed his intent not to include humans.  By only relying on the patent 
documents to construe claim meaning, the probable court interpretation 
of the definition becomes more certain.  The repeated references to food-
producing animals in Martek’s specification and claims would have 
prevailed to cover only what was certainly taught by the invention.  
Following this method consistently would increase uniformity in the 
patent system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Federal Circuit should follow the narrow approach 
for construing patent claim terms.  The Federal Circuit has provided two 
approaches for construing claim terms, a broad and narrow approach.  
The broad approach was used to construe the term “animal” in Martek.  
This lead, however, to a decision that did not consider the inventor’s 
intent of the coverage of the invention, added uncertainty into ordinary 
meanings of claim terms, and decreased uniformity within the national 
 202. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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patent system.  The Federal Circuit could have avoided these problems 
by applying the narrow claim construction approach. 
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